South-Western College Publishing - Economics  

Policy Debate: Should there be a shorter period of patent protection for prescription drugs?


 

Issues and Background

The overwhelming evidence from around the globe supports the thesis that the protection of private property is central to improving economic performance. This protection must extend to intellectual property and patents on drugs. Attenuation of patents therefore goes further than simply making developing country disease an unattractive avenue for pharmaceutical research and development; it undermines economic growth and human health.
~Roger Bate and Richard Tren

 

The inefficiency stemming from the patent is both large and indisputable. The most basic principle in economic theory is that goods should sell at their marginal cost of production (including a normal profit). In the case of patented drugs, prescriptions that are produced for as little as $1-2 each can sell for hundreds of dollars as a result of patent protection. The rationale for this gap is that the firm has to be able to recover its research costs, which are often quite significant.
~Dean Baker

 

Concerns over bio-terrorism during the Fall of 2001 raised questions in the U.S. and Canada about the length of patent protection for Cipro, the only medication approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the treatment of inhalation anthrax. While there were many advocates in both countries for the elimination of this patent protection, both countries decided to maintain the patent (partially because low-cost generic alternatives such as penicillin were known to provide alternative effective treatment for this illness). The high cost of effective medications for malaria and AIDS have also lead to calls for a relaxation of patent protection for these medications in low-income African countries.

Under current patent law, the patent holder for a pharmaceutical product has the exclusive right to supply the product for 20 years from the granting of the patent. One problem with this, from the perspective of the pharmaceutical companies, is that the 20-year period begins with the granting of the patent, not with FDA approval of the drug. As the time required for drug approvals lengthened substantially due to requirements for more elaborate clinical trials, the period of market exclusivity provided by the patent declined. The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 provided an extension to the patent period equal to one-half of the time from the beginning of clinical trials to the end of the drug approval process. This extension can last for at most five years and the total period of market exclusivity cannot exceed 14 years. To receive this extension, a pharmaceutical company must display "due diligence" in the approval process.

Since patent protection provides the company holding the patent with some degree of monopoly power, the price is higher and the level of use is lower than it would be in a competitive market. Patents exist, however, because there would be no incentive for firms to engage in research and development of new drugs if patent protection did not help to ensure a return that is large enough to make this risky venture profitable.

A difficult tradeoff faces society in determining the length of patent protection for prescription drugs. A shorter period of patent protection results in lower prices and higher levels of use for medications that improve the quality of life (and often help to extend lifespans). A reduction in the length of patent protection, however, would also be expected to result in the development of fewer medications. An increase in the length of patent protection would increase the incentives for research and development, but would make medications more difficult for patients to afford.

Once the patent for a prescription drug expires, other companies may submit generic equivalents to the FDA for approval. When a generic equivalent to a particular medication is approved, it receives 180 days of market exclusivity before any other generic equivalents to this medication are allowed to enter the market. The purpose of this 180-day market exclusivity period is to provide a return on the cost of the drug approval process.

Patent protection is not always a sure means of maintaining a monopoly during the life of the patent. Once a new drug appears on the market, other drug companies are often able to engage in a reverse engineering process that allows them to develop products with similar therapeutic benefits that are sufficiently different chemically to not violate the original patent. It is quite common for the development of a new product to result in the release of several other similar products within a few years. This results in a significant reduction in the return that will be received by the original developer.

Prescription drug prices have been increasing more rapidly than the overall increase in medical costs. As the population ages, the share of GDP devoted to pharmaceutical products is likely to continue to expand. It is quite likely that drug company patents and profits will continue to be an issue of concern for the next several decades.

 

Primary Resources and Data

  • Food and Drug Administration
    http://www.fda.gov/
    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the U.S. federal government agency charged with approving the use of prescription drugs for specific applications. The FDA website contains an extensive collection of information about new drug treatments, research studies, and other related issues.

  • Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
    http://www.fda.gov/cder/
    The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research is the part of the FDA that deals with prescription drug approvals. This website contains information about specific drug approvals, research studies, and a useful description of the drug approval process.

  • United States Patent and Trademark Office
    http://www.uspto.gov/
    The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office website provides extensive information on the patent process in the U.S.

  • Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association, "Understanding Brand-Name and Generic Drugs: What You Need to Know"
    http://www.cdma-acfpp.org/en/resource_education/drgpln_qa.html
    This online document, provided by the Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association, contains information on the relationship between generic and brand-name drugs. It is noted that generic drugs are used to fill over 40% of all Canadian prescriptions. (This document is in Microsoft Word format and may be read only if Word or an appropriate viewer program is installed on your computer.)

  • Gerald J. Mossinghoff, "Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its Impact on the Drug Development Process"
    http://www.fdli.org/pubs/Journal%20Online/54_2/art2.pdf
    Gerald J. Mossinghoff, in this 1999 article appearing in the Food and Drug Law Journal, provides a detailed history and a discussion of the key provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. This Act provides for an extension of the length of patent protection to compensate for time spent during clinical trials and the new drug approval process. (The Adobe acrobat viewer plugin is required to view this document. You may download this viewer by clicking here.)

  • Prescription Drug Pricing Pathfinder, "Statutory Protection"
    http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/classes/alr/pathfinerexample2/StatutoryProtect.html
    This webpage provides a useful overview and history of the patent law affecting prescription drugs.

 

Different Perspectives in the Debate
  • Roger Bate and Richard Tren, "TRIPS and Healthcare: Rethinking the Debate"
    http://www.policynetwork.net/IPhealth/rethinking_the_debate_0701_batetren.htm
    In this July 2001 article, Roger Bate and Richard Tren examine the effect of patent protection on the treatment of malaria. They note that malaria remains the leading cause of death among the worlds' poor. While chloroquine, a low-cost generic drug, is still somewhat effective in treating malaria, parasites have begun to develop a high level of resistance to this drug in many regions. High levels of resistance are also beginning to appear for other low-cost treatments. The most effective treatments are relatively expensive since they rely on patented medications.

    Bate and Tren note that a lack of patent protection in Thailand and India has reduced the profitability of patented anti-malarial drugs. They observe that only 5 of every 5000 medications tested are submitted for clinical trials and only 1 of these (on average) will be approved. These high investment costs can be covered only if effective patent protection is provided. Roche has ceased development of anti-malarial drugs because of the low return that it has received on its earlier investments. Bate and Tren argue that the protection of patent rights is essential for the continued development of effective drug therapies.

  • Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
    http://www.phrma.org/
    The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America represents U.S. pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology companies. This web site contains information about the views of the pharmaceutical industry on a wide variety of policy issues (at the international, federal, and state levels). This site provides information on the cost of prescription drug research, development, and approval. Information on new drugs under development is also provided at this site.

  • Dean Baker, "The Real Drug Crisis"
    http://www.cepr.net/real_drug_crisis.htm
    Dean Baker examines the effect of patent protection for prescription drugs in this July 25, 1999 online article. While he recognizes that there is a need to compensate firms for research and development spending, Baker suggests that the current system of patent protection is highly inefficient. He argues that this system results in prices that substantially exceed marginal costs and provides incentives for further inefficiency in the form of rent-seeking behavior. It also provides firms with an inefficient incentive structure that encourages them to duplicate the research efforts of other firms. Baker argues that alternative methods of funding research should be given serious consideration. He also suggests that there are substantial equity issues associated with trying to impose the U.S. patent system on low-income countries.

  • Dean Baker, "The Case Against Protectionism"
    http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2001/0501baker.html
    Dean Baker argues against the current system of patent protection in this May 1, 2001 online article appearing in Dollars and Sense. He suggests that patent protection is a form of protectionism and results in the same inefficiencies as other forms of protection. Baker indicates that the package of anti-viral drugs used to combat AIDS in the U.S. costs approximately $10,000 a year, but could be produced for approximately $350 a year in countries that do not enforce patent protection. Baker believes that the current system of patent protection substantially harms consumers and distorts incentives.

  • David Webber and Michael Kremer, "Stimulating industrial R&D for neglected infectious diseases: economic perspectives""
    http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/papers/WHO_bulletin.pdf
    David Webber and Michael Kremer, in this online research paper, examine the reasons for the low level of R&D expenditure for many infectious diseases. They note that research is directed towards those areas in which there is both a high probability of success and an expected positive rate of return. Webber and Kremer observe that there tends to be underinvestment in research in drug therapies that would primarily benefit low-income patients in less developed countries. Among the reasons cited for this:
    • most basic research is publicly funded, but governments in developed economies fund more research for treatments for those health problems that are most severe in their own countries -- low-income economies do not have sufficient funds to provide a high level of research support.
    • less developed countries have relatively poor health-care infrastructures, reducing the availability to the public of effective treatment programs (prescription drugs cannot be sold to patients who do not have access to physicians and pharmacies).
    • effective patent protection does not exist in all less developed economies.
    • pharmaceutical companies have limited information on potential health-care markets in less developed economies.
    • the expected return to research and development is low due to the low incomes of those afflicted with these illnesses.
    Weber and Remer recommend that increased government research funding or tax credits for R&D would help resolve the problem of imbalance in R&D funding. They also recommend the use of tax credits for sales of medications to nonprofit and international organizations. Guaranteed government purchases of medications that for such illnesses would also alleviate the incentive problem facing pharmaceutical companies.

  • Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Group, "Pharmaceutical Prices: What's Missing in the Public Discussion"
    http://www.pfizer.com/are/about_public/mn_about_economicrealities.html
    In this online article, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals provides its views on the high expenditures on prescription drugs. It is noted that most of the increase in expenditures on prescription drugs is due to an expansion in the use of prescription drug treatments, not the result of increases in the price of medications. They argue that the discovery of many new effective drugs have improved the treatment of many types of illness.

  • Harvey E. Bale, Jr., "Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals: A Platform for Investment, Markets, and Improved Health in the Americas"
    http://www.sice.oas.org/ip/Phrma_e.asp
    In this March, 1996 paper, Harvey E. Bale, Jr. provides a case for patent protection for prescription drugs. He notes that those countries that do not have effective patent protection for prescription drugs have low levels of research and development in the pharmaceutical industry. They also tend to have relatively high rates of illness.

  • Southern Utah Health Care Magazine, "Issues and Politics on Rising Drug Costs"
    http://www.southernutah.com/exec/index/CIN/74489/
    This online article summarizes many of the issues associated with rising drug care costs. Among the issues discussed are:
    • are the benefits from new and more expensive medications sufficient to justify their higher costs?
    • is the increase in direct marketing of prescription drugs to the public beneficial?
    • what can be done for senior citizens without prescription drug coverage?
    The high costs of the research, development, and drug approval processes is discussed, as is the need for patent protection to make such investments profitable.

  • Bureau of Competition and of Policy Planning, Federal Trade Commission, "180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications: Comment"
    http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9911/bcpcomment.pdf
    In this November 4, 1999 document, the staff of the Bureau of Competition and of Policy Planning of the Federal Trade Commission discuss the need for a "use it or lose it" provision for the 180-day exclusivity period for new generic drug equivalents. It is argued that this revised FDA rule would result in more rapid introductions of new generic drugs and would benefit consumers. (The Adobe acrobat viewer plugin is required to view this document. You may download this viewer by clicking here.)

  • Brian Ross and Jill Rackmill, "FTC Files Drug Company Complaint"
    http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/DailyNews/drugprices000316.html
    In this online March 16, 2001 ABC News article, Brian Ross and Jill Rackmill discusses two cases in which it was alleged that drug companies agreed to not provide generic equivalents for a brand-name drug in return for a payment from the producer of the brand-name product. In the first case, Andryx Corporation was alleged to have agreed to delay the release of a low-cost generic heart drug in return for a payment of $40 million per year from Hoechst Marion Roussel, the producer of Cardizem CD. The second case involved an alleged payment of $4.5 million a month from Abbot Laboratories to Geneva Pharmaceuticals to prevent the release of a generic equivalent to Hytrin.

  • Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), "Statement Submitted to the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property"
    http://www.bio.org/laws/tstm070199.html
    In this July 1, 1999 statement, the Biotechnology Industry Organization argues that the Hatch-Waxman Act should be amended to provide a day-for-day extension of patent protection to compensate for the lost marketing time as a result of clinical tests and the drug approval process. It is argued that such an extension will result in the development of more effective treatments for cancer, diabetes, Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases, and arthritis.

  • August 4, 1999 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy
    http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/8499pjl2.htm
    In this statement, Patrick Leahy argues against an extension of the patent for Claritin and other "pipeline drugs." He notes that these drugs had already received patent extensions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and as a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Leahy suggests that policies should be made for all firms, not on a case-by-case basis.

  • Bob Carlson, "Oregon Attempts to Blaze Trail with 'Reference-Based' Formulary"
    http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0107/0107.oregonforumlary.html
    In this July 21 Managed Care article, Bob Carlson examines a prescription drug cost-containment program that is under discussion for Oregon's Medicaid program. Under this plan, the state would adopt a formulary consisting of an approved list of drugs that are both clinically and cost effective. Those using drugs that are not on the formulary would have to pay the difference between the approved medication and the prescribed drug.

  • Carol M. Ostrom, "Lower drug prices in Canada a prescription for outrage in U.S."
    http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/...
    Carol M. Ostrom examines the differences in the prices of prescription in the U.S. and Canada in this September 5, 2000 article appearing in the Seattle Times. She notes that the prices of the most frequently prescribed prescriptions for the elderly is dramatically higher in the U.S. than in Canada. This is particularly true for uninsured individuals who are not part of HMOs that negotiate lower drug prices. Ostrom argues that one reason for this is that the U.S. is the only industrialized country that does not regulate prices for newly released prescription drugs. Another reason is the higher incomes of U.S. citizens. Ostrom notes that the pharmaceutical industry claims that high profits are needed to offset research and development expenditures. Yet, the return on equity in this industry is twice that of the average large industry.

  • Minority Staff, Special Investigations Division, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, "Prescription Drug Price Discrimination in the 7th Congressional District in Maryland: Drug Manufacturer Prices Are Higher for Humans than for Animals"
    http://www.house.gov/cummings/pdf/animals.pdf
    This February 16, 2000 study notes that the wholesale price of prescription drugs is over twice as high when the drugs are sold for human use than when the same drug is sold for animal use. It is suggested that drug companies are engaging in price discrimination as a result of their monopoly power. This price discrimination results in substantially higher prices for many commonly prescribed medications. Furthermore, it is noted that individuals insured through HMOs also pay relatively lower prices for medication, while low-income uninsured individuals pay substantially higher prices. This price discrimination results in higher prices being charged to those who can least afford them.

  • Diplomatic Planet, "What's Behind U.S. Drug Companies' Response to the AIDS Crisis Abroad?"
    http://www.diplomaticplanet.net/topnews/kw01aug01A.html
    This online article discusses the actions taken by U.S. drug companies in dealing with the AIDS crisis. It is noted that several U.S. drug companies have begun to supply AIDS medications at substantially reduced prices in low-income countries. It is suggested that these actions are partially the result of an attempt to avoid further negative publicity and also a way of dealing with competitive threats from generic drug producers in countries such as India that do not enforce U.S. drug patents.

  • WHO/WTO Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs
    http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/hosbjor_presentations_e/hosbjor_presentations_e.htm
    This page contains links to the texts or PowerPoint slideshows used by participants in the April 2001 WHO/WTO Conference on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs. This conference addresses the issues concerning access to expensive drugs in low-income countries that face serious health problems. The extensive materials provided on this website provide useful information on the effect of patent protection on drug availability and pricing in both high-income and low-income economies.

  • Robert M. Goldberg, "The War Against Cipro: Schumer's biofoolishness"
    http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-goldberg102501.shtml
    In this October 25, 2001 National Review article, Robert M. Goldberg provides an argument against the earlier termination of Cipro's patent. He notes that there there are many low-cost generic drug treatments that are effective against anthrax. Goldberg argues that the early termination of patents reduces the incentive for firms to engage in research and development.

  • Council on the Economic Impact of Health System Change, "The Economics of Prescription Drug Pricing"
    http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/hcast_index.cfm?display=detail&hc=188
    This website contains audio, video, and slide presentations from a March 28, 2001 conference at the National Press Club. The arguments presented at this conference provide a nice overview of the major arguments involving the effect of patent protection on prescription drug prices.

  • Donald J. Sutherland, "The Continuing Rise in Prescription Drug Expenditures"
    http://www.socioeconomic.org/Publications/Perspectives/drugprice.pdf
    Donald J. Sutherland examines the causes of the rise of prescription drug expenditures in this June 2001 online paper. He notes that prescription drug prices have increased by over 12% in seven of the thirteen years through 2000. Sutherland notes that this increase has been, in large part, the result of due to increased use of drug therapies and a switch to newer and more expensive medications. While prescription drug expenditures have been rising, many of these new drug treatments have resulted in overall savings in health care costs. He notes that this has been particularly true in the treatments for "ulcers, schizophrenia, asthma, strokes, migraine headaches, and kidney disease." Sutherland argues that the expenditures on prescription drugs should be evaluated in terms of their overall effects on health care costs. (The Adobe acrobat viewer plugin is required to view this document. You may download this viewer by clicking here.)

  • Johnson & Johnson, "Prescription Drug Costs, the Industry and Access to Medicines that Work"
    http://www.jnj.com/our_company/healthcare_issues/Prescription_Drug_Costs.htm
    This webpage, provided by Johnson & Johnson, provides information on the causes of rising prescription drug prices. It is noted that prescription drug prices represent a small share of total health expenditures. Johnon & Johnson also provide evidence indicating that most of the increase in costs are the result of newly developed treatments.

  • Anna Cook, "Why Different Purchasers Pay Different Prices for Prescription Drugs"
    http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/Drug-papers/CookPricingMemo-final.htm
    In this memorandum, prepared for the Department of Health and Human Services, Anna Cook examines the nature of price discrimination in the market for prescription drugs. She observes that the monopoly power created by patent protection allows for the existence of price discrimination. Under this system, the highest prices are paid by uninsured individuals. This often means that those with relatively low incomes pay the highest prices for prescription medications.


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